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If contractionary adjustment packages can survive three years of
sharply deteriorating social indicators, income distribution will
probably improve - but people below the poverty line will
probably suffer irreparable damage in health, nutrition, and edu-
cation.
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Bourguignon, Branson, and de Melo carried out  contractionary packages. These result in a more
model simulations to quantify the effects of  equal distribution of income during adjustment,
different stabilization packages on the distribu-  but the distributional improvements of the
tion of income and wealth. They did so for a  targeted package are mostly reversed in the post-
representative economy subject to the interest  adjustment period.
rate and terms-of-trade shocks of the early
1980s.  The authors' simulations support the view
that stabilization packages that do not have
Their simulations suggest that a sharply  specific components targeted to the poor will
contractionary stabilization package has a major  redistribute income in a way that, although
adverse impact on the distribution of income.  transitory, is likely to permnanently  harm those
The resulting shifts in distribution are likely to  below the poveny line - in terms of things like
make the package less sustainable, even though  nutrition, health, and education.  The sharp
income distribution becomes more equal when  redistributive effects of stabilization packages
normal policies are resumed.  that omit specific targeted policies to alleviate
poverty are also likely to endanger the sustaina-
Contrast this with the model results for the  bility of the adjustrnent package.
targeted expenditure cuts advocated by critics of
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1.  Introduction
Declining  terms-of-trade,  rising real  interest  rates  on external
debt  and  a  virtual  halt  of  adjustment  lending  were the  major  contributors
to  the  crisis environment  under which weze  executed many adjustment
programs  supported  by the  World  Bank  and  IMF. A characteristic  of these
programs  has  been  the  joint  participation  of the  institutions  and  hence  the
simultaneous  emphasis  on stabilization  and  structural  adjustment.  Stabili-
zation  policies placed emphasis on  demand management,  while  structural
adjustment  programs placed emphasis on  supply-side  effects.  The  two
concepts,  however,  are  not  easily defined and  separated: for  example,
exchange  rate  policies are  a  fundamental  element  of both  Fund-supported
stabilization  packages  and  of  Bank-supported  structural adjustment
packages.
Recently,  distributional  implications  of these  adjustment  packages
have  received increasing scrutiny.  In  particular,  they have  been
criticized  for  their  lack of  focus on  the welfare of the  poor.  These
adjustment  packages  have  been  criticized  for  seeking  excessive  reduction  in
aggregate  demand,  thus  resulting in  an  unwarranted  contraction  of output,
employment,  and  living  standards of  the  poor.  These  adjustment  programs
have also  been  criticized Zor  their  lack of  emphasis  on mitigating  the
adverse  distributional  implications  of external  shocks  on the  poor.  l/
The  most  thorough  critique  is in  Cornia,  Jolly,  and  Stewart  (1987)
where  a strong  argument  is  also made  for  an activist  role  for  adjustment
programs. In their  outline proposal for  "Adjustment  with a  Human  Face,'
Cornia  et al.  suggest a  combination  of  expansionary  macro  policies  and
sectoral  (and micro) policies that  are  targeted towards the  poor  and
designed  to increase  equity  and  efficiency.  In support  of their  targetting2
approach,  they  cite  evidence  showing  that  increases  in  nutrition,  education
and  health  raise  productivity  and  that  small  farms  where  the  landless  poor
are  located  have  higher  productivity  than  large  farms. They  further  offer
suggestive  time  paths  of  adjustment and  incomes of the  poor  under  their
proposed  package  in  contrast with  the  standard  adjustment  packages  they
criticize  (ch.  6).
While  very informative  and  thoroughly  researched,  this  approach
offers  no framework  which  ties  the  macro  and  micro  policies  they  suggest.
Neither  is there a  coherent analytical framework  underlying  the  studies
undertaken  by the  IMF  and  World  Bank  in response  to this  rising  concern.  2/
For  example,  the  sensible  methodology  proposed by Heller  et al. (1988,  ch.
3)  is tot  classify the  poor  across  economically  meaningful  socioeconomic
groups;  describe  how  the  policies included  in  a typical  adjustment  package
are likely  to affect  these  groupst then  to speculate  on  how the  poor fared
during  adjustment,  usually  without  attempting to impute  whether  any  change
in  their  status  was due  to the  effects  of  the  adjustment  program  or to  the
(unsustainable?)  preprogram  situation  (Heller  et  al.,  p. 8).
The  purpose  of this  paper  is  to  go  a step  beyond  these  earlier
efforts  by using  counterfactual  simulation  analysis to  derive  orders  of
magnitude about  the  likely  distributive  implications  of  alternative
adjustment  strategies  for-the poor.  Our  analysis relies  on the  socio-
economic  classifications  proposed  in  the  studies cited  above. The  paper
also  relies  on previous  estimates of  the  magnitude  of adjustment  that  was
required  during  the  period  when  the  adjustment  programs  supported  by  the
Bank  and  the  Fund  were  in  effect.  These  previous  efforts  allow  us  to  build
sensible  base  scenarios and  counterfactuals  as  well as a representative
classification  of the  poor  by  meaningful  socieconomic  groups.3
The  distinctive  characteristic  of our  simulation  model  is  that  it
links  the  short-run impact of  macroeconomic  policies that affect  the
distribution  of income  through  inflation,  the  interest  rate  and  other  price
changes,  with the more-often emphasized  medium-run  impacts  of adjustment
policies  (i.e.  incentive  reforms) that affect the  distribution  of income
through  relative  commodity  and  factor  price  changes. We are  therefore  able
to  address  many  of the  criticisms that  have  been  raised  against  the  recent
adjustment  packages  (e.g.  their  lack of  emphasis on supply  response  and
their  excessive  use  of demand  management  policies).
The  remainder  of the  paper  is  organized as follows: Section  2
outlines  the  model  which  is  described in  fuller  detail  in the  appendix.
Section  3 discusses  the  stylized  sectoral  disaggregation,  the  socioeconomic
classification  and  the  initial income and  asset  distribution  among  socio-
economic  groups. The  selection of counterfactuals  is  presented  in section
4  and  the  simulation  results  in section  5.
2.  Model  Outline
The  distinguishing  characteristic  of  the  model  used  for  our
counterfactual  simulation  analysis  is its  ability  to capture  the  short  and
medium  to  long-run effects of  stabilization  and  structural  adjustment
policies  on the  distribution  of  income.  A full  description  of the  model
end  of its  various  closures  is  in Bourguignon,  Branson,  aad  de  Melo (1988).
Functional  forms  and  equations  of a  one  sector  model  are  in  the  appendix.
Here  we focus  only  on  how  we  model  income  and  asset  distribution  and  the
linkages  between  the  macro  and  micro  elements  in  the  model.4
Analytically,  one  can  distinguish  two  interacting  channels  through
which  these  adjustment packages  may  have  adversely affected income
distribution.  The  first,  and  more  easily  quantifiable  channel,  has  to do
with the  medium  to long-run  effects of  cuts  in government  expenditures  and
changes  in  production incentives  brought about by  changes  in relative
prices  following  changes  in  tariffs, other tares,  and  the  exchange  rate.
For  a given  mix  of  expenditure  reduction, the  extent  of relative  price
rigidities  (e.g.  fixed  real  wages  or  mark-up  pricing),  the  extent  of factor
mobility  (e.g. supply elasticities), and  differences in  consumption
expenditure  patterns  across  socioeconomic  groups  will determine  the  medium
to long  run  distributional  impacts of the  resulting  structural  adjustment.
De  Melo and  Robinson (1982) give  a  numerical  exercise  quantifying  these
various  effects.
In addition  to changes  in  the  level  of  activity,  the  second,  and
more  difficult  to quantify  channel, comes  from  the  short-run  effects  that
stabilization  programs  have  on the  distribution  of  wealth  (and  income)  via
portfolio  shifts  operating  in  increasingly  integrated  capital  markets. In
these  integrated  markets, foreign exchange controls are  ineffective  in
preventing  capital flight when  expectations  mount  that  a stabilization
program  will soon  be abandoned.  First  noted  by Diaz-Alejandro  (1979,  1985)
and  further  elaborated  by others  (Foxley 1983,  Corbo,  de  Melo,  and  Tybout,
1986).  unsuccessful stabilization  programs with  relatively  high capital
mobility  have  often  allowed  the  holders of financial  assets  to shift  their
portfolios  from  domestic  to  foreign assets prior  to a  major  devaluation,
thereby  realizing  a capital  gain.  So  far  this  short-run  channel  by  which
stabilization  programs  may affect  the  distribution  of income  and  wealth  has
not  been quantified.  Though  the  emphasis  is  not on short-run  dynamics  and5
expectations,  the  simulation  model  developed here quantifies  the
interaction  of  these  two  channels  through  which  the  distribution  of  income
and  wealth  is affected  by adjustment  packages.  The first  channel  is
captured  by  the multi-sector  computable  general  equilibrium  (CGE)  models
where  distributional  shifts  mostly  occur through  relative  price  shifts.
The  second  channel  is conveniently  captured  by the  standard  IS-LM  macro
framework  for  an  open  economy  (e.g.  Tobin,  1969;  Branson,  1979)  where  asset
prices  are  endogenously  determined.  The  model  described  here  incorporates
features  from  these  two  traditions.  3/
We  start  with  the  mapping  of  the  functional  distribution  of  income
into  socieconomic  groups  at  the  microeconomic  level,  then  we  show  how  macro
and  sectoral  policies  affect  the distribution  of  income  and  wealth.  Next
we  discuss  our  treatment  of  the  financial  and  government  sectors,  and  close
with  a  description  of  goods  and  factor  markets.
2.1 Determination  of  Income  and  Wealth  Distribution
Sectors  are indexed  over i, factors  over j  and  socioeconomic
classes  over  k.  The description  of sectors,  factors  and  households  is
described  in  Table  3. Let Pkji denote  the share  of  class  k in  factor  j
employed  in  sector  i. Then  non-labor  income  of  class  k is  given  by:
(2.1)  k  i  j  £  kji  V"ji  Fji
where  VMPji  is  the  marginal  revenue  product  of  factor  j  in  sector  i,Fji.
The  same  mapping  is  used  to  determine  physical  wealth  allocation  by  class:
(2.2)  VI'm  E  P jqji  Fi k  kj6
where  qji is  the  price  of  factor j  in  sector  i.  (The  number  of factors
qectors  and  households  is  discussed  in  section  3).
Households also hold  financial  assets.  Aggregating over
socieoconomic  classes,  the  household  sector (denoted  by subscript  h) holds
the  following  financial  assets:  money, Hh,  domestic  bonds,  Bh,  and  bonds
denominated  in  foreign  currency,  Fh.  The  total  wealth  constraint  is:
(2.3)  Wh  - Vh +  Hh + Bhi  +  eFh/i*
where  i* is  an exogenous foreign interest rate and  i is  an endogenously
determined  domestic  interest  rate  in  the  model.
The  mechanisms  by  which  policy changes  affect  the  distribution  of
income  and  wealth  are  threefold.  First, changes in factor  rewards  and
employment  affect  directly  income distribution  by socioeconomic  class  (or
household  since  the  two  are  equivalekLt  here). Household  real  incomes  are
further  affected  by  changes  in  returns  on financial  assets  since  household
incomes include income from  financial holdings.  Second, changes  in
relative  product prices affect households'  real  incomes  differentially
because  consumption  expenditures  are  specified at  the  household  level.
Third,  household wealth distribution  is  affected by  capital  gains  and
losses  and  by portfolio  decisions.
Now  turn  to  a  more specific  description  of  how  adjustment  policies
affect  the  distribution  of income and  wealth  along  the  channels  described
above.  The  linkages are  summarized  in  figure 1  which  shows the
determination  of a *period*  equilibrium.  The  distribution  of income,  Yk,
and  wealth,  Wk, at the  household  (socioeconomic  group)  level  is  affected  by7
Figure  1:  MACRO-MICRO  LINKAGES  AND INCOME  DISTRIBUTION
Exogenous  Policy  and  Foreign  Variables
Tax
H,  9,  G (e:  AB*),  (w;  L),  Rates;  P*,  i*
w  m
Endogenous  Macro  Variables
P  P, i. (AB*,  e),  CA,  KA,  I, (L  ,W)  -i  Income  (y)




Endogeneous  Micro  Variables  wk
Change  in  Asset  Holdings
Xi,  Vi, (pd;  Ui)  Firms  and  Households
i
Initial  Conditions  and  Exogenous  Structural  Parameters
Initial  Level  Elasticities;
and  Distribution  Demand  and.  Supply;  e  ^e
of Liabilities  Asset  Choice;  p ,  e ,  (mi;  Ui),  K  . g  ,  g
by Issuer  and  Migration  -1  A  s
Holder  Elasticities
Notation:  See  text  particularly  tables  0  and  2;  h is  a subscript  indexed
over  households;  i  is a  subscript  indexed  over  sectors. Other
subscripts  do  not represent indexes. Superscript  e represents
an expectation,  an  asterisk superscript  a  variable  denoted  in
foreign  currency  units.8
the  endogenously  determined  values for macroeconomic  and  microeconomic
variables. In turn,  the  joint'y determined  values  of  macroeconomic  and
microeconomic  variables  depend  on  the  exogenously  given  values  of policy
variables  and  exogenous structural  variables  (elasticities,  expectations,
and initial  conditions).  Typically, the  values  of  exogenous  structural
variables  are  invariant across simulations  while  the  values  of policy
variables  depend  on the  selected  policy  choices  in  the  adjustment  package.
The  exogenous  policy  variables  in  the  maquette  are: the level  (G)
and  composition  of  nominal government expenditures;  the  money  supply
and  the  degree  of  control  of  the  money  supply  by the  Central  Bank (9);  the
nominal  exchange  rate  (e)  or  government  borrowing  abroad  (AB4);  tax  rates.
Additional  exogenou-  wariables  include:  the  foreign  interest  rate  (i*);
import  prices  (Pm);  and  the  level of  foreign  export  demand. This  menu  of
policy  variables  thus allows the  maquette to  capture the  major  policy
instruments  applied  in  a typical  adjustment  package.
The  endogenous  macroeconomic  variables  determined  in the  maquette
ares  the  foreign  currency  price  of exports  (Pe);  inflation  (P);  government
foreign  borrowing  or the  nominal  exchange  rate;  the  current  (CA)  and  capi-
tal (KA)  accounts;  investment (I); unemployment (Lu)  or  the  nominal/real
wage (w). The  microeconomic  variables  ares  sectoral  outputs  (Xi);  sectoral
intermediate  demands (Vi): relative prices (Pi) or  sectoral  capacity
utilization  rates  (Ui)  if  exogenously  specified mark-up  rates  (mi)  are  in
effect;  and  asset  holdings.
The  dynamics  of the maquette are  simple in  the  sense  that  the
equilibrium  solution  values  in  any  given period  only  depend  on current  and
past  values  of endogenous  and  exogenous  variables. The  next three  sections
describe  the  assumptions  and  functional  form  specifications  which  determine
the 'periodu  equilibrium  described  in Figure  1.9
Table 1:  MONETARY SECTOR BALANCE SHEET
Assets  Liabilities
Rest of the World
*  *  1*  *  *
eLv +  eBw  eFh  +eR
Government
- I  ~~~~~~~~Bb  +  Bh  +  eBw
Monetary Survey
e3  + B  + L  Hh + Hf + Net Worth a/
Private Sector
Firms  Hf  eL  + L
*  ~  ~~~  b
Households  Hh +  h +  Bh
a/  Changes in  Central Bank Net Worth  are assumed to absorb chanIes in the
home-currency value of foreign  exchange  reserves  given  by R Ae.  Thus
the latter do not affect the money supply.10
2.2  The  Financial  Sector
To  capture  the  distributional  implications  of adjustment  programs,
we distinguish  five financial units: government,  households,  firms,  the
consolidated  banking system, and  the  foreign sector.  We assume  that
governments  do  not  lend  and  that  households  do  not  borrow. Because  of thin
or  nonexistant  equity markets in  most  developing countries, it is  not
included  here,  and  the  endogenously  determined proportion  of  household
savings  allocated  to  physical  capital is  made  directly  available  to  firms.
Household  savings  is  first  allocated to  cash  balances,  the  remainder  being
allocated  in  a first  stage  between  bonds  and  physical  assets.  In  a second
stage,  expenditure  on  bonds  is  allocated between domestic  and  foreign
bonds.  Firms' financial requirements  are  for  investment  expenditures,
working  capital,  and  interest payments on  their  stock of domestic  and
foreign  debt.  The  distinction  between firms and  households  allows  us to
separate  productive  and  distributional  implications  of adjustment  packages.
However,  to  avoid  modeling  the  details of  the  process  of creating  inside
money,  we integrate the  commercial banks and  the  Central  Bank  into  an
aggregate monetary survey, following  IMF  practice.  The  resulting
simplified  Zinancial  structure  is shown  in Table  1.
2.3  The  Government  Sector
Critics  of Bank-Fund  supported programs point  out  that  excessive
reductions  in government expenditures  fall disproportionately  on capital
expenditures,  and  within  current  expenditures,  disproportionately  on  health
and  education  expenditures.  In an  analysis  with  a  macroeconomic  focus,  it
is  not  possible to  capture meaningfully a  direct link  between  type  of
government  expenditure,  productivity,  and  income distribution.  Thus,  we11
treat  sectoral  productivity  growth rates, gA,  as exogenous  and invariant
between  simulations  (although  it  would  be easy  to  link  productivity  growth
with say  public and/or private investment  if  sufficient  evidence  were
available  at the  aggregate  level).
The  government collects taxes,  and  disburses subsidies, on
commodities.  The  government  also employs  government  workers,  paying  these
workers  an  exogenous  wage.  Changes  in  public  sector  employment  and  changes
in  public  sector  wages  are  part  of  aggregate  demand  management  common  to
stabilization  programs.  The  government also has  exogenously  determined
investment  and  current expenditures.  Both  components of  government
expenditures  are  also  part  of  expenditure  reductions  in  the
counterfactuals.  Finally,  the  government deficit is financed  by a  mix  of
foreign  borrowing  (eAB*w),  borrowing from the  private  sector  (ABh),  and
borrowing  from  the  Central  Bank (Aib)  (see  table  1).
The  government's  budget  constraint  is given  by:
(2.4)  G7Pc  +Iij,  + i-Pc  - (AB +  AB*
(Net  indirect  tax  +  Import  tariff)  - i_ (Bb  +  Bh)  - (i1(eB,)
In (2.4),  the  first  three terms on  the  LHS  are  the  three  components  of
government  expenditures  described  above  (a  bar  over  a varible,  or a  product
of variables,  indicates that the  variable, or  product  of  variables,  is
exogenous,;  the  term  in  parenthesis  on  the  LHS  includes  the  three  sources
of financing  of the  fiscal  deficit.  The  first two  terms  on the  RBS  are
revenues  from  tax  collection,  and  the  last two  terms  are  the  payments  on12
the  domestic  and  on the  foreign issued components  of the  public  sector's
debt.
2.4  Goods  and  Factor  Markets
Assumptions  about  goods  and  factor  markets  are  summarized  in table
2.  The  assumptions  are  familiar from the  literature  on CGE  models.
Because  the  model  is short-run,  capital once  installed  is fixed  within  the
period:  intersectoral  capital  mobility  is  achieved  through  time  by capital
stock  depreciation.  The  technology for  gross  output  assumes  a separable
production  function  for  value-added  and  intermediates.  For  each  sectoral
demand,  some substitution  is  allowed between the  use  of domestically
produced  goods  in  that  sector  and  competitive  imports  to that  sector. To
save  on  parameter  choice,  the  same elasticity  of substitution  between  the
domestic  good  and  the  competitive  import  is specified  for  all  components  of
domestic  final  demand, hence  expenditures  are  on  a composite  good  with
price  pc.  Imports  are  available in  perfectly  elastic  supply  but  foreign
export  demand  may  be less  than infinitely  elastic, so that  the  terms  of
trade  may be endogenous.  Thus  a  devaluation  or a change  in  protection
gives  some  scope  for  import substitution,  but  export  expansion  involves
some  deterioration  in  the  terms  of trade.
In the  simulations,  two  closures are  adopted  with respect  to the
foreign  sector. In one  closure,  the  exchange  rate  is  fixed,  in  which  case
government  borrowing  abroad  is  endogenous  and  given  bys
(2.5)  AB*  -CA  + AF- - AL* w  h  w13
Table  2:  FACTOR  AND  COMMODITY  MARKETS
Factor  Markets
Capital  Stocks  Fized
Exogenous  labor supply for  each category (agricultural  labor;
modern  sector  labor;  informal  labor)
Goods  Markets
Technology
*  CES for  Value  Added
*  Leontief  for  Intermediate  Non-Competitive  Imports
Final  Demand
*  CES  between  Imports  and  Domestically  Produced  Goods  for  all
components  of final  demand
*  LES for  private  consumption  expenditures
*  Exogenous  Government  Expenditures  (see  section  2.3)
*  Export  Demand:  Constant  foreign  price  elasticity  of demand
*  Investment  Demand:  function  of  the  profit  rate  measured  in
terms  of the  opportunity  costs  of  borrowed  funds.
Market  Clearing  Assumptions
*  Labor  Markets:
Endogenous  market  clearing  wage for  agricultural  employment
Exogenous  nominal  wage for  government  sector  labor.
Exogeneus  nominal  wage for  modern  sector  labor.
Migration  between  informal  labor  and  agricultural  labor.
*  Goods  Market:
Market  Clearing  Price  Adjustment
Dynamics
Price  Expectations:  Exogenous
Exogenous  labor  force  growth
Exogenous  productivity  growth14
where  CA  is  the interest  inclusive  current  account  expressed  in  foreign
currency.  In  the  other,  government  borrowing  abroad  is  exogenous  and  the
exchange  rate  adjusts  so  that:
(2.6)  CA  --JBW  +  AF -AL* w  h  w
In  all  simulations,  we  assume  full sterilization  so  that  the  money  supply
is  independent  of  the  current  account.
3. Sectoral  and  Household  Disaggregation  and  Elasticity  Specification
3.1 Sectoral  and  Household  Disaggregation
The  sectoral,  socioeconomic,  and factor  market  disaggregations
reflect  our  focus  on  income  distribution.  The  sectoral  disaggregation  and
wealth  ownership  mapping  according  to equations  2.1-2.3  is  described  in
Table  3. As  suggested  by  Kanbur  (1987),  Heller  et  al.  (1988),  the  poor  are
among  the  following  socioeconomic  groups:  (1) landless  rural  labor  who
receive  their  income  from  the  labor they supply  to  the  primary  export  and
agricultural  sectors;  (2)  agricultural  small  holders  (or  small  farmers)  who
receive  their  income  from  the  land  they  own  and  from  their  supply  of  labor;
(3)  the  urban informal  sector  here represented  by  informal  workers  who
receive  their  income  from their services  in  the  informal  non-agricultural
sector  where  they  are  paid  their average  value  product  (no  other  factor  is
employed  in  that  sector). In addition  to  these  groups,  the  urban  formal
sector  is  represented  here by the *modern  labore  socioeconomic  group,  a
group  which  includes  government  workers  as well as  labor  employed  in  the
three  manufacturing  sectors  and  in the  formal  non-traded  sector  (see  Table
3). The  description  of socioeconomic  groups  is  completed  by  capitalists15
who  receive  their  non-financial  income  from several  sourcess  land  and
natural  resources  in the primary  export  sector  (e.g.  mining  activity)s
labor  supply  to  the  modern  industrial  sectorss  and  income  from  the  capital
they  own  in  all  sectors.  4/  The  distribution  of  physical  and  human  wealth
by  socieconomic  group,  though  arbitrary,  is meant  to  be  representative  of
the  fact that householdrj,  when classified  in such  large  socioeconomic
groups,  receive  their  income  from  several  sources.  5/ Thls  assumption  that
socioeconomic  groups  receive  income  from several  sources  mitigates  the
distributional  effects  of  policy  changes.
Initial  distributions  of financial  assets  and  liabilities  (see
Table  3)  are  also  made  up  but  meant  to  be  representative  of  an  economy  with
a  relatively  low  debt/equity  ratio  with  private  sector  debt  mostly  concen-
trated  in  domestically  issued  debt.  Only capitalists  hold  a fraction  of
their  financial  wealth  abroad. Also capitalists  and  big  farmers  are  the
only  socioeconomic  groups  holding  domestic  bonds.  For the  remaining
socioeconomic  groups,  money  is  the only  financial  asset.  Initial  economy-
wide  financial  ratios  indicate  an  economy  with  a  moderate  initial  stock  of
public  foreign  debt  (13S  of  GDP or 60S of  exports)  and  a small  volume  of
internally  held  debt. Because  firms'  liabilities  to  the  banking  system  are
relatively  low  (about  10  of the value of  the  economy's  capital  stock),
financial  wealth  is  only  about 10  of the  value  of  physical  wealth  (land
and  capltal).
In  sum,  the  economy  portrayed  here  is  representative  of  a  low-to-
middle-income  economy  that splits  its foreign  exchange  earnings  from  a
primary  export  and  light  manufactures,  with relatively  large  primary  and
informal  sectors,  and  a  simple  financial  sector.  The  initial  distribution
of  income  among  socioeconomic  groups  is not  too  extreme  since  most  socio.Table 3: PRIVATE  SECTOR  DISTRIBUTION  OF  ASSETS  AND  LIABILITIES
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economic  groups  earn  income from more  than  one  source. Finally,  non-
monetary  financial  wealth,  concentrated  in the  hands  of capitalists  and  big
farmers  is  a small  fraction  of total  wealth.
3.2  Elasticity  Specification  and  Calibration
The selected  elasticity specification  is  summarized  in table  4.
As is typical of  such  sxmulation  exercises, the  elasticities  reflect  a
combination  of  averages of  borrowed econometric  estimates (e.g. for
household  consumption,  technology,  foreign trade) and  guesstimates  (e.g.
portfolio  response  elasticitieS.)  6/
The  calibration  procedure  follows that  common  to  CGE  application:
initial  prices and  quantities are  combined with  parameters  (e.g.  tax,
rates,  etc.)  and  elasticities  (essentially  those  in  table  3)  to calculate
share parameters and  exogenous constants that validate the  read  in
quantities  and  prices.  7/  The  presence  of assets  in  our  model  complicates
calibration  since  income  flows  (and hence  consumption  decisions)  depend  on
incomes  earned  (or  interest  paid  for  firms)  from  assets. Our  calibration
procedure  recognizes  this  complication.  In the  simulations  reported  below,
we calibrate  the  model  to the  household  ownership  matrix  described  in  table
3. We also  calibrate portfolio holdings by  firms  and  households  to the
figures  in table  3 and  the  elasticitiee  in  table  4.  8/
4.  Description  of External  Shocks  and  Adjustment  Packages
The  adjustment  programs  supported  by  the  IHF  and  World  Bank  that
were subject  to the  criticisms  noted  in  the  introduction  took  place  in  an
unfavourable  external  environment. An  indication  of how  unfavourable  the18
Table  4:  ELASTICITY  SPECIFICATION
Households
Consumption  Portfolio
0.40  c  expenditure  elas  <  1.40  Money:
-1.25  <  0  (Frisch)  <  - 2.00  2  (semi  interest  elasticity)  - 0.02
0.02  >  Sh c  0.15  p (income  elasticity)  - 0.6
as (proportion  of  wealth  change  Bond  allocation  (e 2 - 1.0)
consumed)  - 0.10
Capitalist  and  farmers'  Physical/Financial  (el  - 1.0)
population  growth  (0.01)
Firms
Technolo&Z  Portfolio
Capital-Labor  subtitution  Working  Capital  (7  - 1.0)
elasticity  in  value-added
(0.7  <  op <  1.1)  Bonds  Re 4 - 1.0)
Depreciation  (5  - 0.04)
Investment
Labor  force  growth  (0.03)  Investment  demand  elasticity
with respect  to  profits
(B/C)  - (0.1)
Technical  progress
(0.02  < g8  < 0.03)
Foreian  Trade
Price  elasticity  of foreign  Price  elasticity  of import  demand
export  demand  (2.0  <  Z  <  3.0)  (0.6  <  cc <  1.5)
Expectations
po  - so  - 0.05
Notes  Intervals  for  elasticities  refer to  all  sectors and  all  socio-
economic  classes.
All  variables  refer  to  parameters  defined  by  the  functlonal  forms  in
the  appendix.  All  parameter  values  remain  unchanged  across
simulations.19
environment  was,  is given  by the magnitude  of external  shocks  for  93
developing  countries  estimated  at a  loas of 5-6 percentage  points  of
average  GDP  during  1982-6  comparzd  with 1978-81.  For  the  same  group  of
co.ntries,  average  GDP  growth  during  the  eighties  was more  than  cut  in  half
(to  2.3Z)  compared  with  average  GDP growth  during  the  seventies.  For  a
smaller  group  of  30  countries  recipients  of IM?  SAPs  and  World  Bank  SAL.,
average  per  capita  consumption  growth  during  1982-5  was  -0.62  compared  with
1Z  during  1978-81. In addition  to a  sharp  fall  in  consumption  growth,
average  investment/GDP  for  the  same  group  of  countries  fell  by  4  percentage
points  to  an  average  of  18.8Z  during  1982-S.  91
This  sharp  deterioration  in performance  was greatly  due  to  the
limited  access  to  foreign  borrowing  which would have  helped  cushion  the
effects  of  rising  real interest  rates and  deteriorating  terms-of-trade.
Therefore  we  shall concentrate  on the distributional  implications  of
alternative  packages  taking  as given this ilmited  access  to  foreign
borrowLng.  However,  it  is  of  interest  to  get  an  estimate  of  the  effect  of
terms-of-trade  and  interest  rate  shocks,  even  if  foreign  borrowing  had  been
available  to  cushion  the impact  of the shock.  We  do this  by  first
simulating  the  model  with  no external  shocks  (called  base  run  (BR)),  then
with  external  shocks  and available  foreign  funds (E-1).  The  subsequent
simulations,  (labelled  E-2  to  E-5 in table 5 where  the  specifics  of  the
policy  experiments  are  detalled)  provide  several  adjustment  scenarios  when
foreign  financing  is  not  available.  To  save  on  space  we  do  not  describe  in
detail  the  results  of  the  BR  and  El  simulations  since  they  refer  to  options
that  were  not  available  during  the period  of  adjustment.  However,  to  glve
a  feel  of  the  magnitude  of  the shock  we  have  simulated,  and  of  what  might20
Table  5:  DESCRIPTION  OF POLICY  EXPERIMENTS
Yearly
Base  Run (BR)  Growth  Rate
A
H  Money  supply  102
A
LG  Government  employment  5X
A  A
W,WG  Wages (Govt.,  modern  labor)  102
A
GE  Government  Expenditure  (recurrent)  52
GI  Government  Investment  102
ER  Rate  of  devaluation  52
A* Pm  World prices of imports  0t
i  Foreign  interest  rate  82
External  Shock: Foreign  Borrowing,  No  Adjustment  (El)
(El):  Same  as (BR)  but
A*~~ 
PM  = 10Z; i - 16Z;  d - 152  for t  - 2, ... ,  5
(t-6,7:  same  as BR)
Adiustment:  External  Borrowing  Reduction  (E2)
(E2):  Same  as (El)  but
ALG =  5.62 a/  t - 2, ... ,  7  (Exchange  rate endogenous)
Adjustment  with Cut  in  Government  Expenditures  (E3)
(E3):  Same  as (E2)  but
A  A  ~~A
WG =  GE - GI =  0  t - 2, ...  ,  5  (t=6,7:  same as BR)
Adiustment  with Wage  Freeze  and  Credit  Squeeze  (E4)
(EM):  Same  as (E3)  but
H - 52;  W - 02  t=2,...,5 (t-6,7:  same  as  BR)
Adjustment  with Targeted  Expenditure  Cuts  and  Targeted  Subsidies  (ES)
Public  Works  (WGLG  - constant);  W-0; t-2,...,5
(E5)  - (El)  +  8I  - 8E - 0  t-2,...,5
(ES)  -(El)  +  Raise  import  tariffs  by 5021  t  - 2,...,5
Subsidy  on sales  of agricultural  products  of 202
t-2,...  ,5
For  t-6,7  variables  have  same  values  as in BR.
a/  Yearly  borrowing  expressed  as a  percentage  of initial  stock  of foreign  debt.21
have  happened  had  external borrowing not  been foreclosed,  the simulation
results  for  BR and  E-1  are  summarized  in  tables  6  and 7.
In the  absence  of external shocks,  average  annual  GDP  growth  over
the  seven  simulation  periods  is  5.5Z with  unemployment  rising  from  4.2Z  to
5.5Z  because  of our  assumption  of a  yearly labor  force  growth  of 42 and  a
yearly  real  wage  increase for modern  labor of  about  5Z.  Under  this
scenario,  external  debt rises from 132  to  45Z  of  GDP  with the  current
account  and fiscal  deficits  remaining at  about  9Z  of GDP,  estimates  that
are  slightly  higher  than those prevailing before the  outset  of external
shocks. In this  favorable environment,  the  distribution  of inkcome  remains
stable  (table  7)  with average  per  capita income  rising  by between  172  and
232  for  all  socioeconomic  groups.
The  effect  of the  external shock  with foreign  borrowing  available
(E-1),  is  to lower  average  yearly  GDP  growth  by one  percentage  point  and  to
nearly  double  the  current account deficit because  of the  higher  interest
rate  on external  debt  and  the higher debt volume  from  having  the  fiscal
deficit  financed  by foreign borrowing.  Under  this (unrealistic)  scenario
with  no adjustment  and  with available  foreign  funds  the  terminal  year  debt-
to-GDP  ratio  rises  to 722.  It  is  noteworthy thet,  by itself,  the  turn
towards  an unfavourable  environment  with  little aA1)ustment  effort  has  a
relatively  4trong  effect  on the  distribution  of incoiie.  Whereas  in  BR the
relatively  uniform  expansion  of  real incomes in  each socioeconomic  group
maintains  a  stable  distribution  of  income,  income  inequality  rises  because
of the  external  shock  (see the  values of  the  Theil  inequality  index  in
table  7).  Furthermore,  real income per  capita which  rose  at an average
yearly  rate  of 3.4Z  now  only  rises at  a rate  of 0.08Z,  much  less  than  GDP
because  of the  effect  of the  debt  service  burden.22
Now  we  simulate  the  effects  of  four  packages  representative  of  the
range  of  selected  adjustment  policies. In all  simulations  we  allow  for  a
small  (and fixed)  amount  of foreign  borrowing  which implies  that  the
economy  must  adjust  by a  mixture  of expenditure  switching  (via  a real
exchange  rate  depreciation)  and  expenditure  reducing  policies  (cuts  in  the
various  components  of government  expenditure).  The amount  of  fixed
foreign  borrowing  is determined  so that the foreign  debt  to  GDP  ratio
follows  approximately  the  same trajectory  as in the  absence  of  external
shocks  (probably  an  understatement  of how  binding  the  external  constraint
was).
Of  the four packages,  the first three represent  increasingly
contractionary  macropolicies  of the type often pursued  under  adjustment
packages  approved  by  the  IMF and World Bank.  The  fourth  package  is  our
interpretation  of  what  might have been the main elements  of  a  targeted
adjustment  package  advocated  by the authors  of  'Adjustment  with  a  Human
Face.*  As  indicated  in  table  5,  all  packages  last  3  years  and  start  at  the
beginning  of  period  2, with exogenous  variables  thereafter  resuming  their
trend  values  in  the  no  shock environment  of the  BR  simulation.  10/ Also
note  that  the  first  three  packages  are  cumulative.
The  first  package  (E2) consists  simply  of  adjusting  by  devaluing
the  exchange  rate  without  increasing  government  employee  or  modern  sector
wages.  The next adjustment  package  (E3),  adds  a  contractionary  fiscal
policy  by  freezing  both components  of government  expenditures  and  public
sector  wages.  Finally,  the most contractionary  adjustment  package  (E4)
adds  a  wage  freeze  for  modern  labor and  a  sharp  reduction  in  the  growth  of
the  money  supply  from  lSS to 5S per year.  By  contrast,  the  adjustment
program  that  seeks  to  minimize  the adverse  effects  of  adjustment  on  income23
distribution  (E5),  combines  the  contractionary  expenditure  effects  of  E-^
with subsidies  to  the  sale of  agricultural  products financed  by a 50Z
increase  in tariffs. In  this  adjustment  program  with targeted  expenditure
cuts,  the  government  mitigates the  adverse impact on  employment  of
contractionary  expenditures  by  a  public  works  program in  which  public
sector  wages  are  cut,  and  public  employment is  expanded  in  such  a  way that
the  public  sector  wage bill  remains  frozen  at its  first  year  value.
5.  Simulation  Results
The  results  of  the various adjustment  packages  on  macroeconomic
indicators  and  the  distribution  of  income appear in  tables 6 and  7.
Because  of the  complexity  of the  model,  only  a few  indicators  are  reported
in  those  tables,  and  to save on space,  much  of the  detailed  interpretation
is  left  to  the  reader. For  example, we do  not  dwell  on the  differences  in
the  terminal  year  fiscal  deficit  ratios  in  E3 and  E4 (2.9Z  vs.  8.1Z)  which
can  be understood  by comparing  growth rates and  interest  rates  in the  two
simulations.
5.1  Macro  Outcomes
Not  allowing the  economy to  raise its  debt-to-GDP  ratio  in
response  to the  external  shock  essentially  doubles  the 'growth  cost,  of the
external  shock,  ll/  as the  average GDP  growth  is  now  2 percentage  points
less  than  in  BR,  even  though unemployment  is  at the  same  level  as in  E-1
(because  the  expansionary  effect  on employment  of the  fall  in  the  real  wage
compensates  for  the  lower  output  growth).
In  the  next  two  packages that  include expenditure reducing
policies, the  contractionary  effect is  much  stronger: with  the  most
contractionary  adjustment  package including a  wage  freeze and  a credit24
Table 6: MACROECNOMIC  ISNCAYS
Experiment End  ot  Initll_
Indlcator  Year (1)  Voluv  U  El  U  _  £4  a
ODP  Growth  !/  F.5  4.5  5.5  5.1  1.9  58.
S  _  - --- I'
INVR/ODP  k/  21.1  13.6  35.5  lOs  #3.  10.0  16.6
Fiscal  Oeficit/GOPN  /  SO9  10.2  1U.0  7.4  210  O.1  0.1
Trade Ialance/GPN kI  6.5  E.6  9.1  0.4  1.5  0.0  0.7
Current  Account/GOPNW  6.0  _.7  16.,  5.6  7.4  5.7  6.1
Money  Growth  s1  U.11.8  18.5  1U.  0.0  .11.1
Intlatlon  !  1.1  7.'  s.9  G.7  5.6  0.4
Rate  of  Devoluatlon /  5.0  5.0  5e  0  10.6  7.5  5.6  0.4
Interest  Rate  9/  9.2  11.4  7.8  0.5  6.3  0.1  6.4
Unemployment  4.2  5.5  0.3  6.1  7.6 10.6  7.0
Terminal  Year  g/
Public  Foreign
D-bt/GDPN  k./  15.0  48.1  71.6  44.6  4.  4
Slulatlon.:
BR  a  base  run (no external shook)
El  * external  shocks  foreign  borrowing,  me  edU 1  -1
E2  *  El  *  foroign borrowlng  reductlen  *oly
ES  * E2  *  out In government  *x_  lturea
E4  u  ES  + odwern  sector  we  free  and  trdit  sqeAz
ES  a  El  + targeted  expenditure  cute  ad targeoW  oAeidie
Notes
CDP  *  real  GO
GODPN  a  current-price  GDP
INYR *  real  investmnt  (public  . private)
f/  Average  compounded  an  nual growth  rte.
Terminal  year ratio  value
/Termilnal  yer  percent value.25
equeeze,  unemployment  doubles  in  spite of the lower  real  wage  because  of
the  contractionary  effect  on investment  of higher real  interest  rates.
Under  this  adjustment  package,  the economy  expands  so little  that  the
fiscal  deficit  (expressed  as  a  percent  of nominal  GDP)  is  hardly  reduced
because  government  tax collection  is  falling  almost  as  rapidly  as
government  expenditures. This simulation  is  an illustration,  perhaps
extreme,  of  thq 'overkill'  criticism  which IMP-type  packages  are  often
accused  of (e.g.  Dell i982).  By contrast,  the  less  extreme  adjustment
package,  (12),  sharply  reduces  the  fiscal  deficit  vith  a  much  lower  rate  of
unemployment.  In  the moderate  (E3)  package,  a  much  lower,  yet  positive
real  Interest  rate  results  in a  terminal  year  Lnvestment-to-GDP  ratio  that
is  S percentage  points  higher  than  in  (14).
The  macroeconomic  results  of  the  targeted  expendlture  cut  package,
15,  are similar  to  those  with  expenditure  cuts  without  targettlAg  (13)t  the
growth  rate  and  the  unemployment  rate  are  close  with  a  somewhat larger
fiscal  defLcit  reduction  in  the  targeted  expenditure  cut  package.  However,
in the  targeted package, protection results in  less  real  exchange  rate
depreciation  and hence less induped  terms-of-trade  loss  throu  export
expansion.  This  raises  growth.  In  contrast,  the  investment-to-GDP  ratio
is  as  low  as  in  the most contractionary  package  in  spite  of  a  much  lower
real  interest  rate.  This is due to the  higher  cost  of  imported  capital
equipment  under  the  more restrictive  trade  policy  vith  higher  protection.
Whereas  the  lesser  terms-of-trade  loss, the lower  real  interest  rate,  and
increased  employment,  all  contribute  to lessen  the  costs  of  protection  on
growth,  the  higher  cost  of  imported  capital  equipment  reduces  growth.  On
balance,  however,  the targeted  expenditure  package  yields  macroeconomlc
indLcators  that  are  about as favorable  as in  the  moderate  package  (E3),26
Tb  ILa  7:  AVERACE  PER  CAPITA  REAL INCOME  BY SOCIOECONO#4IC  GROUP  (RATIOS  TO YEAR  1)
Blas Run
Experisent  (BR)  E-1  E-2  E-S  E-4  E-S
Year  5  a/  a  7  5  7  o  7  a  7  a  7  a  7
Cnpital;sta  (6.3)  /  8.07  1.12  1.19  0.t4  0.90  0.76  0.90  0.77  0.91  0.72  0.61  0.76  0.94
(42.7)
Big  Farwer'  (9.6)  1.08  1.11  1.17  0.94  1.08  0.94  0.97  0.91  O.94  0.88  0.68  1.13  0.94
(15.1)  .
Sol  Fuawro  (80.0)  0.83  1.12  1.21  1.00  1.06  1.03  1.08  1.00  1.00  0.97  0.94  1.24  1.00
(1.0)
Modern Worker.  I/  (27.6)  1.48  1.18  1.21  0.96  1.09  0.78  0.91  0.66  0.82  0.67  0.73  0.62  0.92
(3.9)
Landles  Ag.  Workers  (8.7)  0.80  1.17  1.23  1.00  1.10  1.07  1.08  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.93  1.27  1.00
(0.4)
Informal  Workers  (17.8)  0.56  1.14  1.20  0.68  0.96  0.64  0.69  0.59  0.68  0.43  1.16  0.69  0.77
(0.6)
Econony-Wide  Average  0.91  1.14  1.22  0.9S  1.05  0.79  0.91  0.76  0.67  0.67  0.66  0.79  0.91
Real  P.r  Capita  Income  (5.8)
Thei  I/  22.87  22.07  22.2B  22.67  23.91  21.84  24.16  21.48  2S.44  26.85 22.05  16.26 24.29
26.86  28.28  2t.66  31.88 31.62  29.91  32.88  38.69 36.02  40.82  83.47  24.09  38.92
Head Count g/  S/  S8.78  86.04  87.79  38.15  87.07  56.52  54.87  6.40  86.11  67.67 39.68  56.67  66.19
_  6/  U3.92  S8.04  87.79  6E.71  64.74  66.1  65.48  68.76  67.71  70.52  69.08  65.67  66.80
Poverty  Gap h/  gi  8.85  2.75  1.68  5.62  8.95  7.88  6.41  10.04  7.71  14.74  7.40  4.65  6.21
V  6.6  2.75  1.68  9.62  6.27  14.08  11.19  17.91  14.30  28.91  12.69  10.04  11.64
I/  End of  year.  Year  I  are  luvel  values  (real  wealth  in  parenthess);  all  other  values  are  ratios  to  year  1.
hi  Shares  in  total  population  in  yoar  I  in  parenthese.
S/  Includes  un_aloyed  and  government  workers.
/  Theil  inequality  index;  T - ln  Cvi/w;)I  I;  v*  s  are  inco4  and  population  hare.
S/  Unemployed  included  *  ong  modern  workers.
fr  Uneaployed  included  among informl  workers.
0/  Hoed-count  ratio  Ha  E  p  /  *  e  0.44.  Cost  of  living  at  calm  i;  p  *  population  shares.
y (a  I  i  I  is
I  i
h/  Poverty  gap  i *  E  (a-i)p  E  y  p ;  y  - per  capital  income  of  claos  i.
Notes:  i  is  diacentinuous  becus  we have  aacoud  a  uniform  distribution  of  income among socioeconomic  groups.  The value  of  0
indicates  the  share  of  Ineme which  ould  have  to  be  redistributed  to  brine  thos  below  the  poverty  line  up to  the  poverty
line.27
i.e.  a slightly  higher  growth (and less  terminal  year  unemployment)  but  a
higher  fiscal  deficit.  12/
5.2  Income  Distribution  Outcomes
The  distributional  shifts  resulting from  the  different  adjustment
packages  appear  in table  7.  In  Table  7,  per  capita  real  incomes  at the  end
of each  adjustment  package (year 5)  are  contrasted  with  per  capita  real
incomes  at the  outset  of the  adjustment  package  (i.e.  at the  end  of year  1
which  is identical  under  all  adjustment  packages). We view  these  ratios  as
rough  indicators  of the  sustainability  of  a  package  on the  social  front.
Thus,  for  the  lower  income  groups  (rural  labor,  small  farmers  and  informal
labor  all  have  below  average per  capita  real  incomes),  ratios  below  unity
would  be an  indication  of  pressure from those  socioeconomic  groups  to
abandon  the  adjustment  package  as their  real  incomes  would  be lower  3 years
after  the  package  started.
Because the  unemployment  rate varies much  across adjustment
packages, our  estimates of  the  distributional  impact of  alternative
adjustment  packages  will be sensitive  to  where  we place  the  unemployed. In
the  main  part  of table  7,  we  have  included  the  unemployed  among  the  modern
worker  socioeconomic  group.  However, an  alternative  would  be to assume
that  the  unemployed are mostly among the  informal  worker  socioeconomic
group. For  this  reason,  we  have  reported  two  sets  of inequality  estimates
for  each  one  of our  inequality  measures at  the  bottom  of table  7.  All
estimates  of inequality  are  more  pronounced  when the  unemployed  are  placed
among  the  informal  workers  group.
All the  adjustment  packages  entail a large  negative  annual  growth
in  per  capita  real  income  ranging  from -42  for  E2 and  ES to -6.9Z  for  E4.28
Even  the  less  contractionary  packages  (E2 and  E5)  yield  a  negative  average
real  income  per  capita  growth  of -1.42  for  the  entire  simulation  (including
two  years  of  growth without contractionary  policies).  Even if,  for  a
typical  developing  country,  the  estimates  exaggerate  somewhat  the  extent  of
per  capita  income  loss  during the  adjustment  period,  it  remains  that  the
costs  of  adjustment  in terms  of  per  capita  income  loss  are  large  whatever
package  is  adopted. It  is  also clear  that the  pressure  to abandon  the
packages  was great.  13/
A  further  indication  of the  pressure  to abandon  adjustment  efforts
is  given by  the  *head count' ratio, H,  i.e.,  the  fraction of the
economically  active  population  below  a threshold  real  income  level  taken  as
a poverty  line. Choosing  the  threshold line at Z - 0.44  places  the  small
farmers  and  landless  agricultural  worker  groups below  the  poverty  line  at
the  outset. Depending upon whether the  unemployed  are  distributed  among
modern  workers  (informal  workers), 392  (64Z) of  the  population  is  below
poverty  at the  end  of  year  1. 14/  Even  in the  less  extreme  case  where  the
unemployed  are  distributed  among modern workers, the  share  of population
increases  to over  50?  of  the  population  by  year  5  at  the  end  of  each
adjustment  package.  This  increase in  poverty comes  from  the  informal
workers  who earn  all  their  income in  the  non-traded  informal  sector. All
adjustment  packages  involve  a  real exchange  rate  devaluation  which  lowers
the  real  income  earned  by  this group.  The  purchasing  power  of informal
workers  is  further  eroded  by  the  increased cost  of the  traded  goods  that
enter  into their consumption  basket.  The  position of modern  workers
deteriorates  less  than  that of  informal workers because  their  income  is
earned  in both  traded  and  non-traded sectors.  If  one  reckons  with the  43
percent  fall  in real income for modern workers by  the  end  of the  most29
contractionary  package,  one  can  easily visualize why the  contractionary
packages  advocated by  the  IMF  are  criticized for  leading  to socially
unsustainable  outcomes.  Of  course, the  outcome is  even worse  if  the
unemployed  belong  mainly  to the  informal  workers  group. It is  noteworthy
that  the  most  contractionary  package is  the  only  adjustment  package  in
which  the  capitalists'  relative  position  improves.
The  distributional  shifts during adjustment have  some  common
patterns,  regardless  of the  package. Informal  workers  always  lose  the  most
in  relative  terms  for  the  reasons  discussed above. The  next  group  to lose
the  most is  modern  workers, mostly  because  we have  arbitrarily  distributed
all  the  unemployed  in that  socioeconomic  group.  Small  farmers  and  large
farmers  always  improve  in relative  terms because  their  income  is in  traded
sectors. Finally,  capitalists  usually lose during  adjustment  but  make up
their  loss  in the  post-adjustment  period.
In terms of  income distribution,  the  targeted  expenditure  cut
program  dominates  by far  the  other  packages  at the  end  of year  5.  However,
by the  end  of  year 7,  this  improvement  is  eroded. indeed,  it is  the  most
contractionary  package  which  yields the  least  unequal  income  distribution
at the  end  of the  seven  year  simulation.  This reversal  is  due  to the  sharp
relative  improvement  in  the  position  of  informal  workers  who recoup  in  the
short-run  from  a resumption  in  more  expansionary  policies  because  there  are
no substitutes  for  what  they  produce when real  incomes  start  growing  again
in  response  to  the  expansionary  monetary and  fiscal  policies. This  sharp
swing  is  of course  the  reverse of the  coin  whereby  informal  workers  suffer
the  most  under  contractionary  policies.  The  reason  for  the  sharp  contrast
between  E4 and  E5  when the  unemployed are  in  the  modern  workers  group  is
that  in the  contractionary  package, the  migration  from  the  primary  to the30
informal  sectors  is  much  less (there  are  4  percent  fewer  informal  workers
in  year  S  under  E4  than  under E5). With  fewer  people,  the  informal  sector
gains  even  more  from the resumption  of more  expansionary  polLcies  in  E4
than  in  E5. The  swing  in inequality  between  years  5  and  7  is  less  sharp
when  the  unemployed  are  included  among  the  informal  workers.
The  head  count  ratio,  H, ignores  how poor the poor  are. The
poverty  gap measure,  G, also reported  at the bottom  of table  7,  is
sensitive  to  both  the  number  of poor and to how poor  they  are. Also,
unlike  H,  G is  not  discontinuous.  The  value  of  G indicates  how  much  income
as  a  percentage  of  the  tot&i,  would have to be  given  to  those  below  the
poverty  line  to  eradicate  poverty.  The values  for  G in  table  7  clearly
show  the  superiority  of the targeted  expenditure  cut  adjustment  program
over  the  most  contractionary  package  in terms of  the  amount  of  money  that
would  have  to  be  redistributed  to  eliminate  poverty.
The  distribution  of wealth is also affected  by the  choice  of
adjustment  package. Since the model does not include  equLty  and  land
markets,  our  calculations  of  the distribution  of  real  wealth  use  the  real
interest  rate  as  a  deflator  for land and replacement  lost  for  capital.
Given  the  concentration  of wealth in the hands of  capitalists  and  big
farmers,  the  sharpest  wealth  distributional  shifts  occur  between  these  two
groups  as  a result  of shifts  in the ratio of the  replacement  cost  of
investment  goods  to the real interest  rate.  Farmers  benefit  from  the
targeted  expenditure  cut package  which raises  the rent on land  and
capitalists  from  the  most  contractionary  package  because  of  the  higher  real
interest  rate. The shift in financial  portfolios  have  little  impact  on
wealth  distribution  because  of  their  small  share  in  total  wealth.31
In  conclusion  the  issue  of uustainability  is  one  of  timing:  can
the  contractionary  policy  survive  three years of  sharply  deteriorating
social  indicators?  If  it  can, then the  simulations  here  suggest  that  the
dlstrlbution  of  income  would  improve  sufficiently  in  the  years  Lmnedlately
following  the  end of the package.  But the lower growth  and  sharper
dlstributlonal  shlfts  of  the severely  contractlonary  package  suggest  that
it  would  face  great  pressures.  It  should  also  be  stressed  that  the  adverse
distributLonal  shift  durlng  adjustment,  whlle transltory  for  those  above
the  poverty  line,  can  leave  permanent  damage  (nutritLon,  health,  education,
etc.)  for  those  below  the  poverty  llne.
6.  Conclusions
This  paper  h's  presented  a  macroeconomlc  simulation  framework  to
quantify  the  likely  dlstrlbutional  shifts  that  would  occur  under  different
packages.  The  distinguLshing  feature  of the model ls  that  lt  lLnks  the
micro elements  by which structural  adjustment  policLes  affect  income
distribution  through  relatlve  prlce  shlfts  wlth the  macro  elements  of  the
stabilization  components  of  adjustment packages  that affect  income
dlstribution  through  the  level  of  economic  activLty.  Because  the  model  is
faLrly  dlsaggregated  across  sectors,  markets,  and  socioeconomlc  groups,
expectations  which may also  affect  lncome  dlstrlbutlon  are treated
exogenously.
Simulations  wlth  the  model were carried  out  for  a  representatlve
economy  subject  to  the  lnterest  rate  and  terms-of-trade  shocks  of  the  early
elghties. The simulatlons  suggest  that the short-run  effects  on  the
distrlbution  of  income  of  a  sharp contractLonary  package  are  large.  These
shifts  are  likely  to  endanger  the  sustainabliLty  of  the  package  even  though32
the  distribution  of  income becomes more  equal when  normal  policies  are
resumed.  (These reverse distributional  shifts are  not  anticipated  or
discounted.)  By contrast,  the  targeted  expenditure  cut  programs  advocated
by the  critics  of  contractionary  packages result in  a  much less  unequal
distribution  of  income during the  adjustment package, even  though  the
distribution  improvement  is  reversed in  the  post-adjustment  period. Of
course,  the  subsidy  component  of the  targeted  package  could  in  principle  be
extended,  but  at  the  cost  of  continued distortion  and/or  future  fiscal
strain. In  conclusion,  insofar  as  the  economy  and  simulation  packages  are
representative,  the  paper  supports the  view  that  stabilization  packages
which  do  not  have  specific  components  targeted  towards  the  poor,  will  have
a  noticeable  adverse  effect  on  the distribution  of  income,  which  is  likely
to  result  in  some form of permanent  damage  for  those  below  the  poverty
line.33
Footnotes
1I  See  Cornia,  Jolly,  and  Stewart  (1987),  Taylor  (1987).
2/  See  World  Bank (1986), Huang and  Nicholas (1987),  IMF (1986)  and,
more recently,  Heller  et al  (1988).  Kanbur  (1987)  is  an exception.
He develops  practical  measures to measure poverty  at  the  household
level  using  expenditure  survey  data.
3/  The  financial  sector  is  in  the  tradition of Tobin  (1969),  Branson
(1979). The real  sector  is  in the  CGE  tradition  (Dervis  et al,  1982)
and  income  distribution  is  modelled  as in  Adelman  and  Robinson  (1976)
but  in  less detail.  All  markets are  assumed to  clear  in the
representative  period  and  there  are no  lags.  The  model  does  not
address  the  short-run dynamics of  adjustment as  in  e.g.  Khan  and
Zahler  (1983).
41  Note  that all  sectors except primary export and  informal  non-
agriculture  use  capital and  that  the  ownership of capital  across
socioeconomic  groups is  the  same  for  all  sectors (and  does  not
exhaust non-labor income because of  retained earnings).  This
distributive  sssumption  is the  result of oar  desire  to calibrate  the
model  so  that capital ownership shares are  consistent  with the
savings  rates  by socioeconomic  groups  at  the  bottom  of table  3.  (By
consistent is  meant  that  the  distribution  of  capital across
socioeconomic  groups  would  remain constant if  the  share  of savings
allocated  to capital  remained  equal  to its  base  year  value.)
5/  Figures  for  modern  labor in  table  3  refer to  the  case  of full
employment  in  the  modern  labor market.  In case  of  unemployment  of
modern  labor because of  fixed wages,  rationing falls on  modern
workers  and  not  on  capitalists.  In  that  case,  the  correaponding
shares  in table  3 become  endogenous.
6/  A desirable  step  in specific  country  applications  would  be to  combine
of the  shelf parameter selection  with  econometric estimates  for
elasticities  deemed  crucial  in that  particular  application.
7/  For  a description  of calibration  procedures  see  Dervis  et al. (1982)
(appendix  B).
a/  The  calibration  is  achieved  by  iterations  involving  at each  step  the
recalculation  of incomes  inclusive  of interest  earned  (paid)  based  on
assumed  values  for  prices, interest rates and  expectations  for  the
pre-simulation  year.  At  each iteration, the  calibrated  parameter
values  and  constants for  technology  and  consumption  behavior  are
maintained,  but  those for  portfolios are  recalculated  until  the
desired  portfolio  holdings  (given  by  the  ratios  in table  3) are  the
desired ones  for  the  read  in  initial values for  prices and
quantities.34
9/  All  figures  are from World Bank (1988).  Also see  Faini  et  al.
(1988).
10/  In  all  packages,  it  is assumed  that  there  is  sufficient  credibility
in  the  monetary  policy  of the Central  Bank  (because  money  supply  is
kept  from  rising)  so  that  the Central  Bank  has  full  control  over  the
money  supply  and is therefore  able to sterilize  the  effects  of
capital  flows.  Because  our model is  not  well  suited  for  adjustment
under  highly  inflationary  conditions  --  no  durable  goods,  portfolio
decisions  for  incremental  flows rather  than  for  the  total  portfolio
and  exogenous  expectations  --  we  do not consider  an  adjustment
package  that  would  rely  heavily  on  the  inflation  tax.
11/  Of  course,  this  does  not  account  for the  fact  that  the  economy  has  a
higher  volume  of  debt  than  in  BR.
12/  The  slightly  lower  growth  in E3  is also due  to  the  shift  towards
consumption  because  of  the  strong  wealth  revaluation  in  that  package.
(Wealth  changes  are  fairly  similar  for  E2,  E4  and  E5.)
13/  Sachs  (1986)  contrasts  the experience  with  adjustment  of  East  Asian
and Latin American  countries,  noting  the pressures  to abandon
stabilization  in  Latin  America  because  of  the  high  income  per  capita
loss  during  1980-5  which he estimates  at about 20S for  8  Latin
American  countries.
14/  Since  the  distribution  of  income  is  assumed  to  be  uniform  within  each
socioeconomic  group,  this  is  the  only approach  we  can  take  to  define
poverty.  It  would  be easy to  postulate  a  lognormal  distribution  of
income  within  each  socioeconomic  group as in de  Helo  and  Robinson
(1982).  Such  an  approach,  however,  would  not  add  much  to  the  present
discussion  since  within-group  variance  ls exogenous  and  there  is
little  information  on variances  among the socioeconomic  classes
defined  here.35
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Appendix
Description  of  the  Model
This  appendix  describes  the  model  outlined  in  section  1. It  draws
on  an  earlier  paper,  Bourguignon,  Branson,  and  de  Melo  (1988)  where  a  more
complete  discussion  of  the  model is available.  To  simplify  notation,  the
presentation  is  made  for  a  one  sector  model,  but  the  reader  should  think  of
accompanying  subscripts  for goods  markets,  labor markets,  and  household
consumption  and  financial  decisions.  As a  rule,  no  subscripts  appear  for
sectors,  nor  for  labor  markets,  but a  subscript  h  is  used  to  denote  a
variable  indexed  over  households  and a  subscript  t  to  indicate  time  is
used  in  the  description  of  dynamic  linkages.  A subscript  -1  indicates  a
one  period  lag  for  the  value  of  that  variable  and  expectations  about  infla-
tion  and  exchange  rate  changes  are  denoted  by  Pe  and  ee. As  before,
variables  expressed  in  toreign  currency  units  have  an  asterisk  superscript
and  A  is  the  first  difference  operator.
In  the  description  of  the  selected  functional  forms,  the  following
conventions  are  used: A  CES function  with arguments  X 1, X2 is  denoted:
Y-CES  (X 1, X2; A, a, a) with parameters  following  the  semi-colon.  The
corresponding  dual  is  denoted  P  - CESD (PX 1,  PX 2;  A,  a,  U);  the  same
convention  is  followed  for Leontief  (L) and LES (LES)  functions.  Non-
competitive  imports  are denoted  by a  subscript  0  and  foreign  currency




(A.1)  XS - A(t) L(VA, V2)  Leontief production
function for gross
output and value-added
(A.2)  V1 - CES1 (Vd,  vm; gc, 7)  CES intermediate
aggregation function
(A.3)  V2 - L (Vl,  MNC)  Leontief intermediate
technology
(A.4)  VA - CES2 (LS, F, U K;ap, a)  CES aggregation function
for  value-added.
(F  - sector specific
factors;  U - capacity uti-
lization rate; 0 <  U <  1)
Commodity Demand Definitions
(A.5)  Xd - Dd + Ed  Total demand
(A.6)  Dd , vd + Id + Gd + Cd  Domestic effective demand
(A.7)  Mc - vm + Im + Gm + Cm  Import demand for
competitive imports
(A.8)  Q - CES1 (M^,  Dd; A2, '7,  Cc)  Composite demand
Prices
(A.9)  pm . P e (1  + tm)  Import  price (competitive m  imports39
(A.10)  p0  P0  e (1+  tmi 0)  Import  price (non
competitive  imports)
(A.ll)  P  - P  e (1  +  te)  pd  Export  price
(A.12)  pd  ;d  p  + ij)  Tax  inclusive  domestic
price
(A  13)  pn , pd  - axPc  - aO  Value-added  price
(A.14)  pc * CESD(Pd,  pm)  Composite  price
Factor  Demands,  Wage  Determination,  and  Expectations
(A.15)  Ld * g  (  U,  F,  Labor  demand  for  category
a  2  ~  F.  ~  s from  short-run  profit
maximization
(A.16)  L8 - Ld  +  LG  Wage  determination;
s  u  EG  neoclassical  full
employment
(A.17)  W  w  + up +  (1  0) (1+Pe)  Wage indexation;  s  denotes s,t  s,t-l  a labor  category
(A.18)  pe  - P_;  ee  - e_1 Adaptive  price
expectations  (P  is  GDP
deflator)
Comimodity Demands
d  - (A.19)  E  Eo (PeP  )  Z; z >  C  Export  demand
Dd  p
(A.20)  -_  g1 ,(_  ;  7' c)  Domestic  use  ratio
(A.21)  It  {  a  ]I_  B  ]_  _  Investment  demand
q(6  +J)  (See  text)
It  > 040
(A.22)  J  i  + (1eO)  (1  + e  i_  bp"  Opportunity  cost  of
credit  (O  is  share  of
domestic  component;  b,a
parameter)
(A.23)  Nf  C  a0X  Non  competitive  imports
(A.24)  C  - LES (PC,  , p.#);  0=il-s  LES  consmption  demand
(,p  is  marginal  propensity
to consume)
(A.25)  GE  -GP  + vLG+ IGP  Exogenous  government
expenditures
(A.26)  I - k  A K  Investment  by sector  of
origin  (k  is  vector
describing  composition  of
capital  across  sectors)
(A.27)  q - k' Pc  Price  of capital  goods
Flexible  and  Fix  Price  Commodity  Harket
(i)  Price  Adjustment
(A.28)  xS , xd  Market-clearing  price
(ii)  Quantity  Adjustment
(A.29)  Ptdmin  - { (pm - 1  1 v)m  Mark-up  pricing;  l=unit
t  --  labor requirement;
mwminimum  share  of period
d  t-1  profit  margins
+ 1  ff  +  apdJ  Cl+p6)  required  for  period  t;
a-input-output
coefficients.
S(U)  , X d  if  pd  p  Utilization  rate
adjustment  in  case  of
or  excess  supply
S(1)  - X  if  p d> p  Price  adjustment  in  case
of excess  demand41
Household Income and Saving
(A.30)  Yh - w8L +  VGLG +  (PNX  -WL)  (1-l)  U is distributed share
of  profits
(A.31)  Sh - sYh - a5 We  Household savings (a.  is
semi-elasticity  of savings
with wealth)
(A-32)  P C =  PCC +  (Yh - Sh- PC)  Household consumption; C
is exogenous consumption
(A.33)  W  - Hh +  Bh/i +  eFhi+p  Household wealth
h/'  +PE  ~constraint
Portfolio Determination (g4):
(A.34)  1  1  [  1  Allocation between
g1 1  JF  physical and financial
assets
(A.35)  J  g2(1+i) +  (l-e 2)  (l+i ) (l+e )  Average nominal
F  92(1+')  +  (1-92)  ('+'*)  ('+""  return on bonds
(A.36)  r - PN*U*6X/6K*K/K  Average nominal return on
physical assets
92  (l+i)  62
(A.37)  2  ,2  Allocation between
1-g2 *g+i  )(+e  )  domestic and foreign
(1+i  ~~~~~  bonds
(A.38)  ln  - ln pc + ar + pln Yh/p  + ln B  Honey demand; 4<0; P>O
r-(l+i)/(l '6) - 1
(A.39)  g3  - AHh  Household saving
Sh  allocated to money42
Household  Savings  Allocation
(A.40)  S  S  - Ah  Household  savings *  h,k  h  allocated  to  non-monetary
assets
(A.41)  S  - +  Household  savings (A.-}  h.k  wh,k  allocation  to  non-monetary
assets
glSh  +  Physical  capital
92(l-g 1) Sh,k  +  domestic  bonds
(i-g 2) (l-g 1) Sh,k  foreign  bonds
Firms'  Investment  Financing
(A.42)  H  [F17F  .pdxs  Working  capital
f  [^e  J  requirements; 7F <  0
*  Ae
where  J'  - (l+i)O  +  (1+i  )(l+e  )(l-G)
(A.43)  S-  PN XS  DP  Firms savings
(undistributed  profits)
(A.44)  BF -q  +  AHf  - S  - g  Shk  requirements to finance
f  1  h,k  investment  expenditures;
BF - ALb +  e*AL*w
(A.45)  DP  - (p  +  iOl) Lb  +  (P0  +  i  1 )eL*  Repayment  of debt (p  is
°-1  b  -1  v  exogenous  repayment  rate)43
Firm Borrowing Allocation and Credit Rationins
(A.46)  44  '  (l+i)  ]  4  Borrowing allocation
1-4  L(1+i,  (ii  e) J  between  domestic  and (i+e)  ~~foreign  bonds
(A.47)  AL  =Firm  domestic  net b  g4BF - PLb  borrowing
(A.48)  AL  - (l-g  ) Lw le - Firm foreign net
w  4  w  VLW  borrowing
Credit  rationing
(A.49)  q  IR - qI - Inf  (0  gF  -9  R  Effective  demand  for
investment  under  rationing
(see  below)
Government Revenue and Deficit Financing
(A.50)  GR  PO  Mc  c  mtm H  Tax receipts




(A.52)  Xs a  xd  Goods  market
Financial  Markets
(A.53)  AH  AB  b +  AL  +  Oe CA  Honey supply definition b  b  (0  * 0; full
sterilization; 9  - 1, no
sterilization)
(A.54)  AB - AHf  +  aHh  Money market equilibrium
(A.55)  AB  h  0;  No domestic bond market44
(A.56)  AFh  - L  - B* - 0  Foreign exchange control h  w  vw
(A.57)  iR  _  i  +  zA; i  > o  Credit  rationing  (shadow (A.57)  i0 - ~0  +  ~  >  0  interest rate
determination  used  to
evaluate  notional  credit
demands)
Foreign  Exchange  Market
*  d -*MNc-*C*  (A.58)  CA - P E-PO  -P  HM+i  (Fh  -L-  B  )  Current  account
A.59)  KA - R-AFh  + AL*  Capital  account  (KF  is
exogenous  capital  flows)
Floating  Exchange  Rate  (ABw  fixed)
(A.60)  CA +  KA - 0
Fixed  Exchange  Rate  (A  endogeneous)
(A.61)  AB*  - -CA-  + AP*  AL v  ~~  ~~h  w
Dynamics
Factors  of Production
(A.62)  Kt-l  + It-l  Capital  stock  definition
(A.63)  LS t - LS,t_1  (1+g  )  Labor  force  growth
(A.64)  At - At-1 (1+ga)  Technical  progress
Note: All elasticities  are  constant  elasticities  and  are  defined  as
positive  numbers. Elasticities  (ei)  entering  the  asset  demand  functions
are share  elasticities,  i.e.:
A
81 A
[e.g.  e1 (  )  / (J  F  r) 1.
l-g145
Firms,  households  and  government  decisions in  goods  markets  are
presented  first.  Next,  asset market behavior by firms  and  households.
Finally  the market  for  foreign exchange which  derives from  goods  and
portfolio  decisions. Alternative  closures and  dynamic  linkages  close  the
discussion.
The representative  firm makes  decisions about  output  supply  and
investment  demand. Output  decisions  derive  from  the  maximization  of short-
run  profits. Technology  is  given  by a  constant  returns  to scale  production
function  with short-run diminishing  returns to  labor,  the  only  variable
factor  along with  intermediate  demand.  Capital is  putty-clays once
installed,  it  can  only be  varied through capacity increase  or through
depreciation.
Technology  for  gross output is  given by  a  Leontief  function
between  value-a.dded  VAj  and  intermediate  demand  with intermediate  demand  a
Leontief  function  for  each  supplying  sector. Thus  there  is  no substitution
between  the  various  components  of  intermediate  demand. However,  within  a
given  sector, domestically  and  foreign produced goods  are  imperfect
substitutes  according to  a  CES  aggregation  function between the
domestically  and  foreign-produced  components (equation  A.2).  As shown  by
the  block  of equations  defining  commodity  demands,  the  same  functional  form
and  elasticities  apply  for  all  components  of final  demand  (equation  6-8).
The  price  block  includes the  definition of  tax  and  tariff
inclusive  domestic  prices,  and  the value-added  and  composite  prices  which
result  from  cost  minimization  (equations  13  and  14). The factor  demand  and
wage  determination  block  indicates the  two  alternatives in  the  labor
market: (i) neoclassical  wage  determination  and, (ii)  wage indexation.
Also  note  that  government employment (and the  government  wage)  are46
exogenous. Finally  price  (and  exchange rate)  expectations  are  taken  to be
adaptive  with a one  period  lag.
Commodity  demands  come  next.  The  domestic  use ratio  (equation  20)
results  from  cost  minimization  under  the  CES  functional  form  described  in
equation  (A.8)  and  export  demand  has  a constant  foreign  price  elasticity  of
demand.  Consumption  demand by  each household class  results  from  the
familiar  LES  after household savings have  been  deducted  from  disposable
income  (see  equations  A.31  and  A.32 below). Government  expenditures  are
fixed  in  nominal  terms  and  the  composition  of a unit  of capital  is assumed
to  be identical  across  sectors  (equation  A.26  and  A.27).
Investment  demand is  determined  by  the  profit  rate  (equation
A.21).  Such a  functional form  is  consistent  with  formulations  of
investment  demand  in  which  there  are  costs of adjustment  and investment
decisions  are-irreversible  (Nickell,  1978, chapter  4).  However,  with this
specification,  the  mod3l  exhibits extreme fluctuations  to  changes  in the
relative  profitability  of investment  caused  by interest  rate  or expectation
changes. For  this reason, real investment is  given by the  quadratic
expression
I/K  - q71  (  C2  + 72 (  C)
where  71 and 72  are  suitably  selected  parameters  so that in equilibrium
when  BIC  - 1, investment  will  be  at  a  level  which  will ensure  a rate  of
growth  of  net capital  stock  equal  to  g.  The  elasticity  of investment  with
respect  to a change  in  profitability,  8I/O(BIC),  evaluated  at  BIC  - 1 is
equal  to a  predetermined  value,  e.  The resulting  shape  of the  investment47
function  is a  quadratic  function  passing  through  th origin. Also  note from
equation  A.22 that  the  expectation  of  a  change  in inflation  is  not fully
incorporated  in  the investment  decision  if  b<l.
Equations  28 and  29  describe the  two  market  clearing  mechanisms
for  commodity  markets:  (i)  Walrasian  price  adjustment  (equation  A.28)  and;
(ii)  Keynesian  mark-up pricing (equation  A.29) with endogenous  capacity
utilization.  When  there  is full capacity utilization  (i.e.  Ui  - 1),  then
prices  adjust  as  under  (i).
Household  income  includes  labor  income and  the  share  of capital
lncome  after  firms  accounting  for  firms retained  earnings. In addition  to
factor income, households receive  income from their  asset holdings
(equation  A.30).  (The  details  on  the  mapping  from  functional  to  household
income  are  described  below.) Household savings  rates  adjust  to changes  in
wealth,  so  the  marginal propensity to  consume is  endogenous  (equation
A.31). The savings rates are  not  aseumed to  be responsive  to interest
rates.  This  assumption  reflects  the  conflict betweer.  income and
substitution  effects of  changes in  interest rates on  saving,  and  the
resulting ambiguity in  the  empirical literature.  Analytically,  the
assumption  is  not  important,  because investment is  assumed to depend
negatively  on the  interest  ratta.  So in  the  maquette,  excess  private  saving
depends  positively  on the  interest  rate  via investment.
The  wealth  constraint shows that households  hold  money  domestic
bonds  and  foreign bonds  in  their portfolio.  Portfolio  determination
follows  the  multi-level determination  discussed above. All  elasticities
entering  the  asset  demand functions,  i, are  share elasticities.  The
allocation  of  household savings is  in  two  stages:  first  households
allocate  savings to  money, then  to  non-monetary  assets.  Within  non-48
monetary  assets,  the  allocation rules  described  in  equations  (A.34)-(A.39)
reflect  the  allocation  structure  described in figure  2(a). The  allocation
satisfies  the  financial  wealth  constraint  (equations  6.4J-41).
Firms  investment  financing  is for  working  capital  requirements  and
for  investment  expenditures.  Equation (A.44) shows  that  firms  can  borrow
domestic  bonds  and  foreign  bonds with  the  allocation  between  domestic  and
foreign  bonds  similar  to  the  allocation  decision  by  households  (equations
A.46-48). When there  is  credit rationing (equation  A.49)  investment  is
residually  determined  from the  national incomc identity  (equation  A.66)
with shadow  interest  rate  determination  given  by equation  (A.58).
The  government  collects  tax  revenues  and  the  government  deficit  is
assumed  to  be  met by  borrowing from the  Central  Bank (ABb),  abroad  (ABw)
and  domestically  (ABh)  (equation  A.51).
Equilibrium in  the money market  takes place under  different
financial  market  closures.  For  example, if  there  are  foreign  eschange
controls,  no foreign  asset holdings are  allowed for  firms  or  households
(equation  A.57).  Also  note  that varying degrees of sterilization  are
accommodated  in the  money  supply  definition  (equation  A.53).
The  foreign  exchange  market  includes the  net  demand  for  foreign
exchange  resulting  from  demand  for  goods  and  assets. The  alternatives  of a
fixed  and  a  floating exchange rates are  given by equations  (A.61)  and
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